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Abstract
Constraints on agent’s ability to pay play a major role in auction design for any setting
where the magnitude of financial transactions is sufficiently large. Those constraints have been
traditionally modeled in mechanism design as hard budget, i.e., mechanism is not allowed to
charge agents more than a certain amount. Yet, real auction systems (such as Google AdWords)
allow more sophisticated constraints on agents’ ability to pay, such as average budgets. In
this work, we investigate the design of Pareto optimal and incentive compatible auctions for
agents with constrained quasi-linear utilities, which captures more realistic models of liquidity
constraints that the agents may have. Our result applies to a very general class of allocation
constraints known as polymatroidal environments, encompassing many settings of interest such
as multi-unit auctions, matching markets, video-on-demand and advertisement systems.
Our design is based Ausubel’s clinching framework. Incentive compatibility and feasibility
with respect to ability-to-pay constraints are direct consequences of the clinching framework.
Pareto-optimality, on the other hand, is considerably more challenging, since the no-trade con-
dition that characterizes it depends not only on whether agents have their budgets exhausted
or not, but also on prices at which the goods are allocated. In order to get a handle on those
prices, we introduce novel concepts of dropping prices and saturation. These concepts lead to
our main structural result which is a characterization of the tight sets in the clinching auction
outcome and its relation to dropping prices.
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1 Introduction
An important direction in mechanism design is to understand how to design efficient mechanisms
when players have constraints on their ability to pay. A first order approximation is to consider
hard budget constraints, in which each agent has a budget and the mechanism is not allowed to
charge him more than this amount. While simpler and more theoretically tractable, hard budgets
stand usually as a proxy for more sophisticated payment constraints.
A recent trend in modern internet marketplaces such as Google AdWords is to offer the bidders
a better control of their spending by allowing them to express more sophisticated constraints on
their ability to pay. A popular feature introduced by Google Adwords in 2010 called “Target CPA
bidding” allows advertisers to report average budget constraints on top of traditional willingness
to pay per item (value) and hard budgets (see [26] for a discussion of this feature in the Google
AdWords blog).
It is important to emphasize that values, hard budgets and average budgets play different roles
in managing an advertising campaign, or more generally satisfying buyers’ desired goals. In order
to illustrate this point, consider a marketplace in which each agent specifies his preferences and gets
allocated a certain quantity of a good (ad impressions, for example) and charged a total amount
for it. Hard budgets are one of the simplest constraints on the total payment: they specify an
upper bound on the total payment. Average budgets specify an upper bound on the ratio of total
payment by amount of goods allocated (or alternatively, a lower bound on the ROI, return over
investment). On the other hand, individual valuations specify an upper bound on the marginal
payment for each individual item, even if some goods are sold at a lower or higher price earlier.
To see the difference more clearly, consider an initial outcome where an agent gets some items and
pays a certain amount that is below his average budget. If he is offered an extra item for a price
less then his value but higher than the average budget, he would prefer the outcome with the extra
item as long as the new total payment and allocations don’t exceed his average or hard budget
constraints. A natural generalization of average budget constraint is to consider a concave upper
bound on the total payment as a function of the number of goods allocated.
We consider here the problem of designing Pareto-optimal mechanisms for settings where the
players have general (concave) constraints on their ability to pay. This includes hard budgets and
average budgets (and combinations thereof), as well as other more sophisticated constraints on the
total payment of agents as a function of the set of goods allocated to them. For the special class
of hard budgets, a sequence of papers [13, 16, 11, 17, 18, 12] studied this problem for increasingly
complex classes of allocation environments using Ausubel’s celebrated clinching framework [3] as
the main tool. Nonetheless, all those results are restricted to hard budgets, and do not handle more
general payment constraints.
Our results and techniques. In this paper, we study the constrained quasi-linear model, in
which each agent has a private valuation, and has associated with it a public1 set of admissible
outcomes where each outcome is a pair of allocation and payments. The utilities are then quasi-
linear if the outcome is admissible and minus infinity otherwise. Our main result is to design an
incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto-efficient auction that handles a general class
1The assumption that the set of admissible outcomes is public is necessary. Dobzinski et al [13] showed that even
for the special case of multi-unit auctions with hard budget constraints, there is no incentive compatible, individually
rational and Pareto-optimal auction if budgets are private. Indeed, most papers in the literature on budgets make
the public budgets assumption [13, 16, 11, 17, 18, 12], including classical references such as Laffont and Roberts [19]
and Maskin [21].
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of these payment constraints. It is worth noting that many attempts to generalize clinching
auctions to other settings such as private budgets [13], or single-parameter concave valuations [17]
have led to impossibility results. In light of that, it is somehow surprising to find a extension for
dealing with a general set of payment constraints for which clinching auctions are flexible, and we
get a positive result.
Our result applies to a very general class of allocation constraints known as polymatroidal
environments. Polymatroidal environments encompass many settings such as multi-unit auctions,
advertisement systems, matching markets, video on demand (routing), and spanning tree auctions.
See Goel et al [17] and Bikhchandani et al [7] for a more comprehensive discussion on applications
of polymatroidal environments.
Algorithmically, our auction can be thought of as a variant of the polyhedral clinching auction in
Goel, Mirrokni and Paes Leme [17] with a more general demand function. While applying a variant
of the previously known algorithm, proving that the auction is Pareto-optimal for more sophisti-
cated payment constraints becomes considerably more challenging, and requires novel techniques.
The reason is as follows: Pareto optimality is usually characterized by a no-trade condition, which
states that given two players H and L with values vH > vL, then for any price p, it should not be
possible to take goods away from the L player by paying him at a rate p for the goods taken away
and allocating them to the H player charging him a rate p, such that it improves the utility of one of
the them without making the other worse-off. For hard budgets, there are two obstructions to trade:
either H has his budget exhausted in the final solution or the trade violates the allocation feasibility
constraints, i.e., H is receiving goods to his maximum capacity. Since neither obstruction depends
on the specific price, one can show that if it is possible to trade at price p ∈ [vL, vH ], then it is also
possible to trade at price p = vH , and vice versa. This implies that one needs to check for no-trade
at price p = vH only, which greatly simplifies the analysis. Now for more general constraints (such
as average budget constraint), this is not true. Meaning it might be possible to trade at a price
p that is strictly between vL and vH but not at price p = vH . The harder part of our analysis is
to get a handle on these prices. In order to do so, we define the concept of dropping prices which
serve as an upper bound on the prices for which trade is possible. We then relate those dropping
prices to the feasibility constraints. This leads to our main structural result which is encapsulated
in our Structure of Tight Sets Lemma (Lemma 4.3 and its Corollary 4.5). We believe that that this
lemma exposes an interesting structure about clinching auctions that can lead to other applications.
We believe that an important contribution of our work is to show that the clinching framework
can be applied to general types of payment constraints. For the special case of hard budgets,
clinching has been recently used as a building block to achieve a variety of objectives: Goel et
al [18] use it to design online allocation rules, Devanur, Ha and Hartline [12] use it as a building
block to approximate revenue in budgeted settings and Dobzinski and Paes Leme [14] use it to
approximate an efficiency-related objective. We believe that the ideas in this paper are a first step
towards solving other problems (online allocation rules and revenue extraction, for example) for
more general types of payment constraints.
Related work Auction design with constraints on player’s ability to pay have been extensively
studied in the literature. Most of the work is devoted to understand the impact of hard budget
constraints in standard auctions, see Che and Gale [10] and Benoit and Krishna [5], for example,
or optimize the revenue in the presence of budget constraints, as in Laffont and Roberts [19], Borgs
et al [8], Chawla et al [9], Malakhov and Vohra [20] and Pai and Vohra [24].
The research line of designing Pareto-optimal incentive-compatible mechanisms with budget
constraints was started by Dobzinski, Lavi and Nisan [13], who study agents with hard budget
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constraints in a multi-unit auctions setting, i.e., there is a limited supply of identical objects to be
sold and the agents have additive valuation over the objects. They also point out that traditional
welfare maximization is impossible in budgeted settings and establish Pareto-optimality as the
natural efficiency goal for settings with payment constraints. Those ideas were extended in many
different directions in subsequent work: Bhattacharya et al [6] study the divisible case and propose
budget elicitation schemes, Fiat et al [16] study the same problem for matching markets, Colini-
Baldeschi et al [11] study the single-keyword sponsored search setting and Goel et al [17] propose
a polyhedral version of this auction that gives a Pareto-optimal auction with hard budgets for
any environment that can be modeled as a polymatroid. Such settings include sponsored search,
matching markets, and routing auctions. They also prove the impossibility of designing incentive-
compatible auctions for very simple polyhedral domains, beyond polymatroidal environments.
For constraints beyond hard budgets, the design of Pareto efficient auctions has been restricted
to unit demand settings, where each agent can be allocated at most one item. Aggarwal, Muthukr-
ishnan, Pal and Pal [1], Dutting, Henzinger and Weber [15], Alaei, Jain and Malekian [2], Morimoto
and Serizawa [22] use techniques inspired by the Walrasian equilibrium literature to design Pareto-
efficient auctions. Baisa [4] studied to which extent efficiency and revenue can be optimized with
minimal assumptions on agent’s utilities.
2 Setting
2.1 Constrained quasi-linear utilities
We consider a natural generalization of budget constrained utilities which we call constrained quasi-
linear utitilies. In this utility model, player i is characterized by a private valuation vi and a public
admissible set Ai ⊆ R
2
+. Upon getting xi units of a divisible and homogeneous good and paying πi
dollars for it, we consider that player i’s utility is:
ui(xi, πi) =
{
vi · xi − πi, (xi, πi) ∈ Ai
−∞ otherwise
In other words, a player behaves like a quasi-linear player if his outcome (xi, πi) is admissable
and has minus infinity utility otherwise. For example, budget-constrained utility functions are
characterized by Ai = {(xi, πi) ∈ R
2
+;πi ≤ Bi}. Average budget constraints can be represented
by Ai = {(xi, πi) ∈ R
2
+;πi ≤ βixi}. Generally, we consider any admissible set of the form Ai =
{(xi, πi) ∈ R
2
+;πi ≤ αi(xi)} for concave non-decreasing functions ability-to-pay function αi : R+ →
R+ with αi(0) = 0.
The condition αi(0) = 0 expresses that a player get zero utility for the zero allocation and zero
payments. The fact that αi is non-decreasing expresses that if a player considers a certain outcome
admissible, it also considers admissible any outcome where he is allocated at least as much and pays
no more then the original outcome. Finally, the concavity of αi expresses that if an agent considers
certain outcomes admissible, it considers any distribution (convex combination) of such outcomes
also admissible.
2.2 Polyhedral Auctions
Given n agents where each agent i has a constrained quasi-linear utility function with value vi and
a valid admissable set Ai, our main problem is how to auction a divible good that may be subject to
allocation constraints. We assume that the set of allocations is described by a convex set P ⊆ Rn+
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πi
xi
Ai : πi ≤ Bi
πi
xi
Ai : πi ≤ βi · xi
πi
xi
Figure 1: Three examples of admissible regions: the first is an example of hard budget constraints,
the second of average budget constraints and the third is an example of generic ability-to-pay
function.
such that a point x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ P if it is possible to simultaneously allocate xi units to each
player i. We call such a set the environment.
We assume that both the admissible sets Ai and the set of feasible allocations P is public
information. The private information of the agents is their value vi for each unit of the good. An
auction is described by two maps: x : Rn+ → P and π : R
n
+ → R
n
+ such that for each valuation
profile v ∈ Rn+ it associates an allocation x(v) and payments π(v). Our goal is to design an auction
that satisfied the following properties:
• admissibility, i.e., (xi(v), πi(v)) ∈ Ai for each i ∈ [n], v ∈ R
n
+.
• incentive compatibility and individual-rationality : each player’s utility is maximized by re-
porting their true value regardless of the reports of other agents. Moreover, he always gets
non-negative utility by doing so. The classic result by Myerson [23] shows that this is equiv-
alent to xi(vi, v−i) being monotone in vi and the payment rule be such that πi(vi, v−i) =
vi · xi(vi, v−i)−
∫ vi
0 xi(u, v−i)du.
• Pareto-efficiency : we say that an outcome is Pareto-efficient if there is no alternative outcome
in which all the players’ utilities and auctioneer’s revenue do not decrease and at least one
increases. Formally, an outcome (x, π) is Pareto-efficient if there is no alternative outcome
(x′, π′) with x′ ∈ P , (x′i, π
′
i) ∈ Ai,∀i, vi · x
′
i − π
′
i ≥ vi · xi − πi,
∑
i π
′
i ≥
∑
i πi and the sum of
those inequalities is strict, i.e.,
∑
i vi · x
′
i >
∑
i vi · xi.
2.3 Polymatroidal Environments
Our results apply to the case where the allocation environment P is a polymatroid. A polymatroid
is a packing polytope that can be written as:
P = {x ∈ Rn+;
∑
i∈S xi ≤ f(S),∀S ⊆ [n]}
for a monotone submodular function f : 2[n] → R+. A submodular function is a set function that has
the diminishing marginals property: f(S ∪ i)− f(S) ≥ f(T ∪ i)− f(T ) for any subsets S ⊆ T ⊆ [n].
An equivalent (and somewhat more traditional) definition is: f(S ∩ T ) + f(S ∪ T ) ≤ f(S) + f(T )
for all S, T ⊆ [n]. We say that this function is monotone if f(S) ≤ f(T ) for S ⊆ T ⊆ [n].
Applications of polymatroidal environments are ubiquous : multi-unit auctions [13], the match-
ing markets [16], sponsored search [17, 11], bandwidth markets, scheduling with deadlines, network
planning, video on demand [7], among others. We refer to citegoel12 and [7] for a more extensive
discussion on these applications.
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2.4 Average Budget Constraints
An important special case of constrained utility functions are average budget constraints, in which
Ai = {(xi, πi) ∈ R
2
+;πi ≤ βi · xi}, where the parameter βi is called the average budget. In this
particular case, the utility function enforces a constraint that the player must pay at most βi per
unit.
At a first glance, this might seem equivalent to a player being quasi-linear with value v˜i =
min{vi, βi}. In order to see the difference, consider two different agents: (1) agent one has value
v1 = 2 and average budget β1 = 1 and (2) agent two is quasi-linear with value v2 = min{v1, β1} = 1.
Now, consider the outcome with xi = 1 and πi = 0. At this point, consider offering an additional
item for each player at the price of 2. The first player would gladly take it, since it is below his
value and doesn’t violate the average budget constraints, but the second player wouldn’t.
Despite of that, both settings are not completely dissimilar. Consider the problem of designing
an incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto-efficient auction to sell one single good to
players with average budgets. It is simple to see that running the Vickrey auction on v˜i = min{vi, βi}
does the trick. Or, more generally:
Lemma 2.1 For multi-unit auctions, i.e., P = {x ∈ Rn+;
∑
i xi ≤ s}, the VCG auction on v˜i =
min{vi, βi} is incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto-efficient auction.
The proof is trivial and is included in the appendix for completeness. The strategy above,
however, doesn’t generalize beyond multi-unit auctions. Running VCG on v˜i for more general
polymatroidal environments is still incentive compatible and individually rational, but fails to be
Pareto-efficient in general. In fact, consider the following very simple example:
Example 2.2 Consider the environment P = {x ∈ R2+;x1 + x2 ≤ 3, x1 ≤ 2, x2 ≤ 2}. For readers
familiar with sponsored search, this corresponds to the sponsored search environment with click-
through-rates (2, 1). Now, consider two agents with average budget constraints and v1 = 10, β1 = 1
and v2 = 2, β2 = 2. Running VCG on v˜ we get allocation x = (1, 2) and π = (0, 1). This outcome is
clearly not Pareto-efficient, since for any 0 < z ≤ 12 , the outcome x = (1+z, 2−z), π = (2z, 1−2z)
is a Pareto-improvement (x, π).
3 Warm-up: the multi-units environment
As a warm-up we consider the problem of designing an incentive compatible, individually rational
and Pareto optimal auction for the multi-units setting, i.e., P = {x ∈ Rn+;
∑
i xi ≤ 1} when agents
have constrained quasi-linear utilities. This will allow us to highlight the main features of our design
in a combinatorially simple setting. The auction we will describe is a discrete step ascending clock
price auction, based on the clinching framework. The auction takes as input the value vi of each
agent and their admissible sets Ai (defined in terms of an ability-to-pay function αi) and produces
a final allocation xi and payments πi for each agent. We will denote βi = limx↓0 αi(x)/x.
The auction is initialized with zero allocation and zero payments for all the agents xi = πi = 0.
The price clock is represented by a vector p ∈ Rn+ where pi represents the price faced by agent i.
Prices are initialized to zero.
In round-robin fashion an agent iˆ is chosen and his price piˆ is incremented by a fixed amount
ǫ > 0. At this point, we compute the demand of each agent, which is the maximum amount of the
good that this agent would want to acquire at price pi, i.e., di = argmaxzui(xi + z, πi + piz). It
can be computed as follows: di = max{zi; (xi + zi, πi + pizi) ∈ Ai} if pi < vi and di = 0 otherwise.
Based on the demands of each agent, we calculate how much each agent clinches in each round,
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i.e., how much it is safe to give to each agent while not making any allocation infeasible for other
agents.
The clinched amount is calculated as follows: let s = 1 −
∑
i xi be the remnant supply. The
total demand of all agents except i is given by
∑
j 6=i dj . We define the difference δi = [s−
∑
j 6=i dj ]
+
as the clinched amount, i.e., the portion of the remnant supply that is under-demanded by agents
[n] \ {i}. The auction proceeds by updating the allocation and payments by giving to each agent
his clinched amount at the current price. We summarize the auction in Algorithm 1.
ALGORITHM 1: Multi-Units Clinching Auction
Input: P, vi,Ai
pi = 0, xi = 0, for all i and iˆ = 1
do
di = max{zi; (xi + zi, πi + pizi) ∈ Ai} if pi < vi and di = 0 otherwise.
δi = [1−
∑
j xj −
∑
j 6=i dj ]
+,
xi = xi + δi, πi = πi + pi · δi,
di = max{zi; (xi + zi, πi + pizi) ∈ Ai} if pi < vi and di = 0 otherwise.
piˆ = piˆ + ǫ , iˆ = iˆ+ 1 mod n
while d 6= 0
The outcome of the auction corresponds to the final allocation and payments of the ascending
procedure. It follows from standard arguments about the clinching framework [3, 13] that this
auction is incentive compatible and individually rational. It is individually rational since it never
allocates any amount at a rate larger then the value vi, so in the end, πi ≤ vixi. It is incentive com-
patible, since the value only determines when an agent drops his demand to zero. By misreporting
his value, an agent can either drop out of the ascending procedure earlier (potentially missing items
he could acquire at a price smaller then his valuation) or drop later (potentially acquiring items for
price larger then his value). Therefore it is a dominant strategy for each agent to truthfully report
his value.
We are left to argue that the auction is Pareto optimal. In order to do that, first, we define
the notion of dropping price and then we give a structural characterization of the outcome in
terms of dropping prices. The main result in this paper (Lemma 4.3) is a generalization of this
characterization for generic polymatroidal environments.
In the rest of the section, we will use the following assumption that holds wlog in the limit when
ǫ goes to zero:
Assumption 3.1 All values of vi and βi = limx↓0 αi(x)/x are multiples of ǫ, which is the price
clock increment in the ascending auction.
3.1 Dropping Prices
Definition 3.2 (Dropping price) Given an execution of Algorithm 1, we define the dropping
price for agent i (we call φi) as the first price for which he had zero demand.
The demand of an agent can drop from positive to zero in the execution of Algorithm 1 for three
different reasons:
1. the first case is where the buyer clinched his entire demand, i.e., δi = di. By the definition
of demand, the player ends up with an allocation such that πi = α(xi), since just before
clinching, his demand was: di = max{zi; (x˜i + zi, π˜i + p · zi) ∈ Ai}, where (x˜i, π˜i) is his
allocation and payment just before clinching for the last time.
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πi
xi(x˜, π˜)
(x, π)
(x+ z, π + pz)
(x+ z, π + p′z)
πi
xi
(x, π)
π = βixi
(x+ z, π + p′z)
Figure 2: Depiction of two reasons a player might drop his demand to zero. Left: by clinching his
entire demand. Right: by having πi = βixi and p > βi.
After this happens, for any price p′ ≥ p, the demand is zero, since a positive demand would
imply that there is some κ > 0 such that: (x˜i + di + κ, π˜i + p · di + p
′ · κ) ∈ Ai. This would
contradict the maximality of zi, since by the concavity of αi, we would have: (x˜i + (di +
κ), π˜i + p · (di + κ)) ∈ Ai. This is depicted in the first part of Figure 2.
2. the player didn’t clinch his entire demand, but the price reached his value, i.e., p = vi.
3. the player didn’t clinch his entire demand, but πi = βi · xi and p > βi. This is depicted in the
second part of Figure 2.
We observe that:
Lemma 3.3 The dropping price φi is at most vi. Also, if the final outcome of agent i is xi = πi = 0,
then φi = min{βi + ǫ, vi}.
Proof : The fact that φi ≤ vi comes from the fact that vi, pi and βi are multiples of ǫ and that
for pi ≥ vi, the demand of i is zero. Also, if xi = πi = 0, there are two reasons for the demand to
become zero: either pi becomes larger then βi or pi reaches vi.
3.2 Multi-units version of the Structure of Tight Sets Lemma
Now we relate the dropping prices to the structure of the final outcome: we show that if one
sorts agents by dropping price, the agents with high dropping price (which we will call H) will be
allocated and charged the maximum admissible amount fo the quantity they get. Agents with low
dropping price (which we will call L) will be unallocated and will be charged zero.
Lemma 3.4 Let (x, π) be the outcome of the clinching auction for the multi-units setting, then one
can partition the set of agents [n] = L ∪ {k} ∪H such that:
• for i ∈ L, xi = πi = 0 and φi ≤ φk.
• for i ∈ H, vi > φi ∈ {φk, φk − ǫ} and πi = αi(xi).
• k drops without clinching his demand, therefore either (i) φk = vk or (ii) πk = βkxk and
φk = βk + ǫ.
Moreover, the clinching auction allocates all the goods, i.e.,
∑
i xi = 1.
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The lemma above is a special case of Lemma 4.3, so we defer a formal proof until that point.
The proof of the special case is implicit in Bhattacharya et al [6] and Goel et al [18]. The main idea
behind it is to show that all agents that acquire a positive amount drop their demand at essentially
the same price: once a player that already acquired a positive amount drops his demand to zero,
all other players clinch their entire demand.
3.3 Pareto optimality
Theorem 3.5 The clinching auction with constrained quasi-linear utilities for the multi-unit setting
is Pareto optimal.
Proof : Let (x, π) be the outcome of Algorithm 1 for valuations vi and admissible setsAi defined by
αi. Assume that an alternative outcome (x
′, π′) is a Pareto improvement, i.e., ui(x
′
i, π
′
i) ≥ ui(xi, πi),∑
i π
′
i ≥
∑
i πi and
∑
i vix
′
i >
∑
i vixi.
Let L, H and k be as in Lemma 3.4. First we show that πi − π
′
i ≥ φk(xi − x
′
i) for all i and
for the case where xi < x
′
i, the inequality holds strictly, i.e., πi − π
′
i > φk(xi − x
′
i). Consider the
following cases:
• i ∈ L, then π′i ≤ min{βi, vi} · x
′
i ≤ φix
′
i ≤ φkx
′
i, where the first inequality follows from the
fact that ui(x
′
i, π
′
i) ≥ 0, the second follows from Lemma 3.3 and the third from Lemma 3.4.
Noting that for i ∈ L, xi = πi = 0, we get: πi − π
′
i ≥ φk(xi − x
′
i)
• i ∈ H, xi ≥ x
′
i: since vi > φi ≥ φk − ǫ and all values and prices are multiples of ǫ, then:
vi ≥ φk. Since ui(x
′
i, π
′
i) ≥ ui(xi, πi), then πi − π
′
i ≥ vi · (xi − x
′
i) ≥ φk · (xi − x
′
i).
• i ∈ H, xi < x
′
i: player i clinched his entire demand at price φi. By the definition of demand
for any κ > 0, (xi + κ, πi + φi · κ) /∈ Ai. In particular, for κ = x
′
i − xi. Since (x
′
i, π
′
i) ∈ Ai,
it must be the case that: π′i < πi + φi · (x
′
i − xi). Now using the fact that φi ≤ φk and
re-arranging the inequality we get πi − π
′
i > φk(xi − x
′
i).
• i = k: then either (i) φk = vk, in which case we use the fact that (x
′, π′) is a Pareto
improvement to get that: πk − π
′
k ≥ vk(xk − x
′
k) = φk(xk − x
′
k); or (ii) πk = βkxk and
φk = βk + ǫ. If xk ≥ x
′
k, we use the same argument as in the second item. If xk < x
′
k, we use
that (x′k, π
′
k) is admissible therefore π
′
k ≤ βkx
′
k so: πk − π
′
k ≥ βk(xk − x
′
k) > φk(xk − x
′
k).
Summing for all i we obtain
∑
i πi −
∑
i π
′
i ≥ φk · (
∑
i xi −
∑
i x
′
i) = φk(1 −
∑
i x
′
i) ≥ 0.
Since
∑
i πi ≤
∑
i π
′
i, the revenue in both cases must be equal, therefore all inequalities must hold
with equalities. In particular, it must be that xi ≥ x
′
i for all i since for xi < x
′
i, the inequality
πi−π
′
i ≥ φk(xi−x
′
i) holds strictly. This in particular implies that
∑
i vixi ≥
∑
i vix
′
i, contradicting
the fact that (x′, π′) is a Pareto improvement.
4 Polymatroidal environments
Now we extend the result in the previous section to general polymatroidal environments. We do so
by changing the way demands are calculated in the polyhedral clinching auction of Goel et al [17].
As usual, incentive compatibility and individual rationality follow as usual from properties of the
clinching framework. The main challenge in extending the result in the previous section to general
polymatroidal environments is extending Lemma 3.4 to combinatorial settings.
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We begin by describing the polyhedral clinching auction for the case of constrained quasi-linear
utilities. The auction takes as input the feasible set P ⊆ Rn+, agent values vi and valid admissible
sets Ai and computes an allocation x ∈ P and a payment vector π such that (xi, πi) ∈ Ai for all i.
The auction, described in Algorithm 2, is a version of Algorithm 1 that redefines the clinching
step to take into account the environment P .
ALGORITHM 2: Polyhedral Clinching Auction
Input: P, vi,Ai
pi = 0, xi = 0, for all i and iˆ = 1
do
di = max{zi; (xi + zi, πi + pizi) ∈ Ai} if pi < vi and di = 0 otherwise.
δ = clinch(P, x, d),
xi = xi + δi, πi = πi + pi · δi,
di = max{zi; (xi + zi, πi + pizi) ∈ Ai} if pi < vi and di = 0 otherwise.
←− point (♣)piˆ = piˆ + ǫ , iˆ = iˆ+ 1 mod n
while d 6= 0
Definition 4.1 (Clinching) Given an allocation x and demands d, the remnant supply polytope
is defined as Px,d = {y ∈ R
n
+;x + y ∈ P ; y ≤ d}. Given an amount zi for player i we define the
polytope on P ix,d(zi) of the possible allocations for [n] \ i if we allocate extra zi units to player i.
Formally: P ix,d(zi) = {z−i ∈ R
[n]\i
+ ; (zi, z−i) ∈ Px,d}. Now, the clinching amount δi is defined as
the maximum allocation to player i that doesn’t make any allocation for other players infeasible:
δi = max{zi;P
i
x,d(zi) = P
i
x,d(0)}.
It follows from standard arguments on clinching auctions that the auction is incentive-compatible,
individually-rational and produces admissable outcomes. See for example Lemmas 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5
in [17].
Theorem 4.2 ([17]) The clinching procedure is well defined (i.e. it stops after finite time and
x ∈ P ). The auction produced is truthful, individually rational and produces acceptable outcomes,
i.e., (xi, πi) ∈ Ai.
The rest of the paper is dedicated to prove that the auction produces Pareto-efficient outcomes.
The proof of Pareto-efficiency is based on a structural lemma that relates the tight sets (i.e., sets
of agents where
∑
i∈S xi = f(S)) to the dropping price as defined in Section 3.1. We note that the
definitions and observations in that section are valid for any environment.
Before we get to those, we introduce some new notation. For a vector x ∈ Rn and a subset S ⊆ [n]
we denote x(S) :=
∑
i∈S xi. Also, for the remainder of the paper, we focus on a polymatroidal
environment P defined by a submodular function f , i.e., P = {x ∈ Rn+;x(S) ≤ f(S),∀S ⊆ [n]}.
We will also keep the same notation used in the previous section: φi for dropping prices, βi for
limx↓0 αi(x)/x. We will also assume, as before, that vi and βi are multiples of ǫ.
4.1 Pareto efficiency via Structure of tight sets
Now we are ready to state the central pieces used to prove Pareto efficiency:
Lemma 4.3 (Structure of tight sets) In any given iteration of Algorithm 2, after clinching is
performed and demands are re-calculated (point (♣) in the description), if S is the set of players
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with positive demand, then S is tight in the final outcome, i.e, x(S) = f(S) where (x, π) is the final
outcome.
Lemma 4.4 If a player clinches his entire demand in a certain iteration of the auction, then there
is a player that in the same iteration drops without clinching his entire demand.
We defer proving those lemmas until the end of Section 4.3. Before, we discuss how to use this
Lemma to prove Pareto-efficiency. Since it is clear that the set of players with positive demand is
shrinking, it gives us a natural nested family of tight sets. Moreover, it is a family where we can
bound the prices for which they acquire goods during the process:
Corollary 4.5 Given an execution of 2, let i1, . . . , ik be the agents who drop their demand to
zero without clinching their entire demand sorted in reverse order in which those events (demand
dropping to zero) happens. Also, let φi1 ≥ . . . ≥ φik be the dropping prices for each agent. Then by
taking Sj to be the set of agents with positive demand just before player ij dropped his demand to
zero, we have a nested family of tight subsets:
∅ = S0 ⊂ S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ . . . ⊂ Sk = [n], x(Sj) = f(Sj),∀j
with the property that: ij ∈ Tj := Sj \Sj−1 and all players i ∈ Tj \{ij} clinched their entire demand
and φi ∈ {φij − ǫ, φij}.
Proof : The proof follows directly from Lemma 4.4. The fact that for i ∈ Tj, φi ∈ {φij − ǫ, φij}
follows from Lemma 4.3 since in the iteration player ij drops, the prices of all the agents are either
φij or φij − ǫ.
The reader familiar with [17] will note the similarity of the nested family in Corollary 4.5 and
the nested family in the proof of Lemma 3.8 in [17]. From the proof in [17] it should be clear that
getting such a tight family is the main ingredient in proving Pareto-efficiency. The difficulty here is
that we need a family which is somehow tied to prices, which wasn’t necessary in [17]. There, one
could simply use values vi are proxies prices φi, since the admissible sets were very simple.
Theorem 4.6 The outcome of the Polyhedral Clinching Auction (Algorithm 2) is Pareto-efficient.
Proof : Let (x, π) be the outcome of the clinching auction and assume that there is an alternative
outcome (x′, π′) such that vi · x
′
i − π
′
i ≥ vi · xi − πi,∀i,
∑
i π
′
i ≥
∑
i πi and at least one of those
inequalities is strict, which means that the sum of those inequalities is a strict inequality:
∑
i vi ·x
′
i >∑
i vi · xi. Also, let x
′ is a feasible point of P , (x′i, π
′
i) ∈ Ai,∀i.
Assuming the structure in Corollary 4.5, first we show that for i ∈ Tj, πi− π
′
i ≥ φij (xi−x
′
i). In
order to show that, we consider three cases:
• xi ≥ x
′
i, i 6= ij : since i clinched his entire demand, then φi ≤ vi−ǫ and since φi ∈ {φij−ǫ, φij},
then: φij ≤ vi. Then πi − π
′
i ≥ vi · (xi − x
′
i) ≥ φij · (xi − x
′
i).
• xi < x
′
i, i 6= ij : player i clinched his entire demand at price φi. By the definition of demand
for any κ > 0, (xi + κ, πi + φi · κ) /∈ Ai. In particular, for κ = x
′
i − xi. Since (x
′
i, π
′
i) ∈ Ai, it
must be the case that: π′i < πi + φi · (x
′
i − xi). Now using that φi ≤ φij and re-arranging the
inequality we get πi − π
′
i > φij (xi − x
′
i).
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• i = ij : in this case: (i) either φij = vij , in which case πij − π
′
ij
≥ vij · (xij − x
′
ij
) =
φij · (xij − x
′
ij
), (ii) or φij > βij and πij = βij · xij . Since π
′
ij
≤ βij · xij , we have that:
πij − π
′
ij
≥ βij · (xij − x
′
ij
) > φij · (xij − x
′
ij
) if xij ≤ x
′
ij
. In the case where xij ≥ x
′
ij
, we can
simply use that φij ≤ vij and then: πij − π
′
ij
≥ vij · (xij − x
′
ij
) ≥ φij · (xij − x
′
ij
).
Now, summing this inequality for all i ∈ Tj, we get:∑
i∈Tj
πi − π
′
i ≥ φij ·
∑
i∈Tj
xi − x
′
i = φij · (x(Tj)− x
′(Tj)) ≥ 0
since x(Tj) = f(Tj) ≥ x
′(Tj). Therefore:∑
i∈Sj
πi − π
′
i =
∑
k≤j
∑
i∈Tk
πi − π
′
i ≥ φij · (x(Sj)− x
′(Sj)) +
∑
k<j
(φik − φik+1) · (x(Sk)− x
′(Sk)) ≥ 0
For j = k, Sk = [n], so: 0 ≥
∑
i∈[n] πi − π
′
i ≥ 0, where the first inequality comes from Pareto-
efficiency and the second inequality comes from the line above. This means that all inequalities
along the way used to prove the inequality above should be tight. This means in particular that
for all i ∈ Tj , either xi = x
′
i or vi = φij , since xi 6= x
′
i and vi > φij would imply a strict inequality
in some of the cases above. Therefore:∑
i∈Tj
vi · (xi − x
′
i) =
∑
i∈Tj ,vi=φij
φij · (xi − x
′
i) =
∑
i∈Tj
φij · (xi − x
′
i) ≥ φij · (f(Tj)− x
′(Tj)) ≥ 0
Summing for all j, we get that
∑
i vi · xi ≥
∑
i vi · x
′
i contradicting the assumption that
∑
i vi · x
′
i >∑
i vi · xi.
Relation to the proof for hard budget constraints: In the proof of Lemma 3.8 in [17] for
Ai = {(xi, πi) ∈ R
2
+;πi ≤ Bi}, the case xi < x
′
i, i 6= ij is simpler, since one can use that πi = Bi ≥ π
′
i
together with vixi < vix
′
i to prove that: πi − π
′
i ≥ 0 > vi(xi − x
′
i). The entire proof can be done
therefore using values vi instead of dropping prices φi. Since there is not a global upper bound on
payment, this approach does not work for a general admissible set.
4.2 Basic Facts on Polymatroids and Clinching
In the previous subsection we showed that the Pareto-optimality follows from Lemmas 4.4 and 4.3.
Proving those statements is the most technically challenging part of the paper. Before we do it,
we would like to review some elementary facts about polymatroids. See [25] for example, for an
extensive exposition on polymatroids.
Lemma 4.7 (Uncrossing) If P is the polymatroid defined by f : 2[n] → R+, and x ∈ P such
that for subsets S, T ⊆ [n], x(S) = f(S) and x(T ) = f(T ) (we say those sets are tight), then
x(S ∩ T ) = f(S ∩ T ) and x(S ∪ T ) = f(S ∪ T ).
Lemma 4.8 (Polymatroid ∩ Box) If P is the polymatroid defined by f : 2[n] → R+, then Px,d =
{y ∈ Rn+;x + y ∈ P ; y ≤ d} is the polymatroid defined by the (possibly non-monotone) submodular
function f˜(S) = minT⊆S [f(T )− x(T ) + d(S \ T )].
Now, we also review a basic fact about clinching, which was proved in [17] :
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Lemma 4.9 (Constructive Clinching) Given current allocation x and payments π and a poly-
matroid P , the clinched amount δi can be calculated as δi = [maxy∈Px,d 1
ty] − [maxy∈Px,d 1
t
−iy−i].
An alternative description is: δi = [f˜([n]) − f˜([n] \ i)]
+ for the f˜ function defined in the previous
lemma.
We note that the f˜ function define in Lemma 4.8 might not be monotone. The non-monotonicity
has to do with the −x(T ) term in the definition. It simple to see that if x = 0, then f˜(·) is monotone,
since for S ⊆ S′ : f˜(S′) = f(T ) + d(S′ \ T ) ≥ f(T ∩ S) + d(S \ T ) ≥ f˜(S), where T is the subset of
S′ minimizing f(T ) + d(S′ \ T ). The following lemma will allow us to define clinching in terms of
a monotone submodular function:
Lemma 4.10 Given a polymatroid P defined by f , x ∈ P and a demand vector d ∈ Rn+, then:
max
y∈Px,d
1
ty = max
y∈P0,x+d
1
ty − 1tx
Proof : The problem maxy∈Px,d 1
ty can be written as max1ty s.t. (x + y)(S) ≤ f(S);∀S; 0 ≤
y ≤ d. Once we relax 0 ≤ y to −x ≤ y and substitute z = x + y we get the problem: max1t(z −
x) s.t. z(S) ≤ f(S);∀S; 0 ≤ z ≤ x + d. So, it is simple to see that maxy∈P0,x+d 1
ty − 1tx is a
relaxation of the first problem. Now, among the optimal solutions z to the first problem, take one
minimizing Φ(z) =
∑
i(xi − zi)
+, i.e., take the optimal solution that minimally violates x ≤ z. We
wish to prove that Φ(z) = 0.
Assume by contradiction that Φ(z) > 0. If this is true, then S− = {i; zi < xi} 6= ∅. Since
1
tz ≥ 1tx (after all z = x is feasible), then S+ = {i; zi > xi} 6= ∅ as well. Now, notice that for
all i ∈ S−, j ∈ S+ and δ > 0, the solution (zi + δ, zj − δ, z−i,j) can’t be feasible, otherwise we
would violate the minimality of Φ. Therefore, there must be a tight set Tij between i and j, i.e.,
z(Tij) = f(Tij), i ∈ Tij , j /∈ Tij. Using uncrossing (Lemma 4.7), the set T = ∪i∈S− ∩j∈S+ Tij we
get a set that is tight, i.e., z(T ) = f(T ), S− ⊆ T and T ∩ S+ = ∅. So, f(T ) = z(T ) < x(T ), where
the second inequality comes from the fact that S− ⊆ T ⊆ [n] \ S+. This contradicts the fact that
x(T ) ≤ f(T ) because x ∈ P .
The previous lemma motivates the following notation for submodular functions capped by a
vector: given a vector ψ ∈ Rn+, define fψ(S) = minT⊆S f(T ) + ψ(S \ T ), which is the submodular
function defining P0,ψ. Using this new notation together with the previous lemmas, we get:
Corollary 4.11 The clinched amount can be calculated as: δi = fx+d([n])− fx+(0,d−i)([n]).
Proof : Notice that maxy∈Px,d 1
t
−iy−i = maxy∈Px,(0,d
−i)
1
ty = fx+(0,d−i)([n])− 1
tx
4.3 Saturation and a proof of the Structure of Tight Sets Lemma
This sets the stage to the definition of saturation, which will be fundamental concept in the following
proofs. First we give an intuitive notion of saturation and then we give a more practical equivalent
definition using the fψ notation.
Definition 4.12 (Saturation) Given x, d in a certain point of the execution of the Polyhedral
Clinching Auction (Algorithm 2) we say that agent i is saturated if there is an optimal solution to
maxz∈P0,x+d 1
tz with zi < xi+di. We say that i is unsaturated if all optimal solutions are such that
zi = xi + di.
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Also, for a fixed agent k, we say that agent i is k-saturated if, for ψ such that ψ−k = x−k + d−k
and ψk = xk, there are optimal solutions to maxz∈P0,ψ 1
tz with zi < ψi. We say that i is k-
unsaturated if all optimal solution are such that zi = ψi.
Intuition of the concept of saturation and a connection to previous work: For the special
case of multi-unit auctions P = {x;
∑
i xi ≤ 1} studied in [13, 6, 18], an important concept is that
of the clinching set – which is the set of players who clinch some amount of the good as the price
increases. For generic polymatroidal setting, the concept of saturation emulates the concept of the
clinching set in the following sense: player i will be able to clinch as the demand of k drops iff k
is i-unsaturated. For multi-unit auctions, the set of k-unsaturated elements are either ∅ or [n]. So,
one can represent this structure by defining the clinching set as the set of players k for which all
[n] are k-unsaturated.
The next lemma gives a more practical definition of saturation:
Lemma 4.13 Let ψ be such that ψ−k = x−k + d−k and ψk = xk. Then agent i is k-unsaturated iff
ψi = fψ([n])− fψ([n] \ i).
Proof : The optimal solution of maxz∈P0,ψ 1
tz that minimizes zi is the one that maximizes 1
t
−iz−i.
Since the feasible set is a polymatroid, one can simply greedly increase each coordinate as much as
one can, leaving i as the last one. Therefore we get zi = fψ([n])− fψ([n] \ i). Now, if zi = ψi, then
i is k-unsaturated, if zi < ψi, then i is k-saturated.
Now, we state and prove two useful lemmas on dealing with submodular functions capped by a
vector:
Lemma 4.14 Given ψ and ψ′ = (ψ′i, ψ−i) with ψ
′
i < ψi and i ∈ S, the following identity holds:
fψ′(S) = min{fψ(S), fψ(S \ i) + ψ
′
i}.
Proof : By the definition of fψ′ , there is a set T ⊆ S such that fψ′(S) = f(T )+ψ
′(S \T ). If i ∈ T ,
then fψ′(S) = fψ(S). If not, then: fψ′(S) = ψ
′
i + f(T ) + ψ
′(S \ T, i) = ψ′i + f(T ) + ψ(S \ T, i) =
ψ′i + fψ(S \ i) by the fact that T minimizes f(T ) + ψ(S \ T, i) for T ⊆ S \ i.
Lemma 4.15 Given an allocation x and demands d in a certain point of the algorithm, let U be the
set of k-unsaturated elements and S be the set of k-saturated elements. If ψ = (xk, x−k+d−k) ∈ R
n
+
and S ⊆ X ⊆ [n], then: fψ(X) = f(S) + ψ(X ∩ U).
Proof : By the definition of unsaturated elements, i ∈ U if ψi = fψ([n]) − fψ([n] \ i). By
submodularity, for every i ∈ X ⊆ [n], ψi ≥ fψ(X) − fψ(X \ i) ≥ ψi, so: fψ(X) − fψ(X \ i) = ψi.
So: Let i1, . . . , ik be the elements in X ∩ U , so:
fψ(X) = fψ(S) +
k∑
j=1
fψ(S ∪ {i1, . . . , ij})− fψ(S ∪ {11, . . . , ij−1}) =
= fψ(S) +
k∑
j=1
ψij = fψ(S) + ψ(X ∩ U)
Now we need to show that fψ(S) = f(S). In fact, by the definition of fψ, fψ(S) = f(T )+ψ(S \T ).
If S \ T 6= ∅, then take i ∈ S \ T , so:
ψi ≥ fψ(S)−fψ(S \ i) = f(T )+ψ(S \T )−fψ(S \ i) ≥ f(T )+ψ(S \T )− [f(T )+ψ(S \ (T ∪ i))] = ψi
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Using the identity we just proved, we have:
ψi ≥ fψ([n])− fψ([n] \ i) ≥ [fψ(S) + ψ([n] \ S)]− [fψ(S \ i) + ψ([n] \ S)] = ψi
which leads to the conclusion that i is k-unsaturated, contradicting the definition of S. Therefore
it must be the case that S \ T = ∅, i.e., fψ(S) = f(S).
Now, we state a sequence of three invariants that are mantained throughout the auction. The
first two of them are proved in [17], while the third one has to do with the concept of saturation
introduced in this paper. The proofs can be found in Appendix A.
Lemma 4.16 (Invariant I: Maximality of clinching) Performing the clinching step twice in a
row without updating prices will result in no amount clinched in the second step. Alternatively: in
point (♣) of the execution of the algorithm: fx+d([n]) = fx+(0,d−i)([n]) for all i ∈ [n].
Lemma 4.17 (Invariant II: All goods sold) At any point of the execution, it is always possible
to sell all the goods. Alternatively: fx+d([n]) = f([n]).
Lemma 4.18 (Invariant III: Self-unsaturation) Through the execution of the clinching auc-
tion, player i is i-unsaturated for every i. Alternatively: fx+(0,d−i)(S) = fx+(0,d−i)(S \ i)+xi for all
i ∈ [n] and S ∋ i.
Now, we are ready to prove Lemma 4.4:
Proof of Lemma 4.4 : Let x, d be the allocation and demands of players at point (♣) of the
execution of Algorithm 2. If before the time the algorithm is in point (♣) some player drops his
demand to zero, we will show that either this player is iˆ (the player for which the price increased)
or diˆ became zero.
If diˆ was zero already, nothing changes when the price piˆ increases, so no clinching happens. On
the other hand, if after p
iˆ
increases and demands are updated, the new demand of iˆ (let’s call it d′
iˆ
)
is still positive, we will see that δi < di for all players with i 6= iˆ and di > 0.
Let’s call d′ = (d′
iˆ
, d−iˆ). So, δi = fx+d′([n]) − fx+(0,d′−i)([n]). First, notice that: fx+d′([n]) ≥
fx+(0,d
−iˆ
)([n]) = fx+d([n]) ≥ fx+d′([n]), where the inequalities come from d
′ ≥ (0, d−iˆ) and d ≥ d
′.
The equality comes from Lemma 4.16. Therefore: fx+d′([n]) = fx+d([n]).
Also, by Lemma 4.14, fx+(0,d′
−i)
([n]) = min{fx+(0,d−i)([n]), fx+(0,d−i)([n]\ˆi)+xiˆ+d
′
iˆ
} If fx+(0,d′
−i)
([n]) =
fx+(0,d′
−i)
([n]), then: δi = fx+d([n]) − fx+(0,d−i)([n]) = 0 < di by Lemma 4.16. If fx+(0,d′−i)([n]) =
fx+(0,d−i)([n] \ iˆ) + xiˆ + d
′
iˆ
, then:
δi = fx+d([n])− [fx+(0,d−i)([n] \ iˆ) + xiˆ + d
′
iˆ
]
4.18
= fx+d([n])− [fx+(0,d−i)([n] \ iˆ, i) + xi + xiˆ + d
′
iˆ
]
4.16
=
= fx+(0,d
−iˆ
)([n])− [fx+(0,d
−iˆ
)([n] \ iˆ, i) + xi + xiˆ + d
′
iˆ
] =
= fx+(0,d
−iˆ
)([n])− fx+(0,d
−iˆ
)([n] \ iˆ) + fx+(0,d
−iˆ
)([n] \ iˆ)− fx+(0,d
−iˆ
)([n] \ iˆ, i)− [xi + xiˆ + d
′
iˆ
]
4.18
≤
≤ xiˆ + xi + di − [xi + xiˆ + d
′
iˆ
] = di − d
′
iˆ
< di
Proof of Lemma 4.3 : Let x, d be the allocation and demands during the execution of the
algorithm in point (♣) . We will show if T = {i; di > 0}, then x([n] \ T ) = f([n]) − f(T ). If we
show that, then we are done, since for the players in [n] \ T , the value of x coincides with the final
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allocation, so, if xf is the final allocation, we know that xf ([n] \ T ) = x([n] \ T ). By Lemma 4.17,
xf ([n]) = f([n]), so: xf (T ) = f(T ).
In the first iteration T = [n], so the property x([n] \ T ) = f([n]) − f(T ) holds trivially. Now
we only need to show that this property is preserved from one iteration to another. Let x, d be the
allocation and demands when the algorithm is at point (♣) . Also, let iˆ be the player whose price
increases just after point (♣) . If diˆ doesn’t drop to zero, no other player’s demand drops to zero
(Lemma 4.4), so T remains unchanged and the property is preserved.
If on the other hand, diˆ becomes zero, we claim that the players whose demand drops to zero
are exactly the iˆ-unsaturated players. Letting d′ = (0, d−iˆ) and then using Lemma 4.14 we can see
that:
δi = fx+d′([n])− fx+(0,d′
i
)([n]) = fx+d′([n])−min{fx+d′([n]), fx+d′([n] \ i) + xi}
= [fx+d′([n])− fx+d′([n] \ i)− xi]
+
Therefore δi = di iff fx+d′([n]) − fx+d′([n] \ i) = xi + di, i.e., i is iˆ-unsaturated. Let U and S be
respectively the sets of iˆ-unsaturated in T and iˆ-saturated players in T . Notice that the players in
U will be ones who will join the set of players with zero demand in the next iteration and their
final allocation (let’s call is xf ) will be xfi = xi+ di for i ∈ U \ iˆ and x
f
iˆ
= xiˆ. The set S will be the
players who will have non-zero demand the next time we reach point (♣) .
In order to use Lemma 4.15, we note that the players outside T are iˆ-unsaturated, since for
k /∈ T , x + (0, d−iˆ) ≤ x + d = x + (0, d−k), therefore: fx+(0,d−iˆ)([n] \ k) ≤ fx+(0,d−k)([n] \ k) =
fx+(0,d−k)([n])−xk, since k is k-unsaturated. This means that: fx+(0,d−iˆ)([n])− fx+(0,d−iˆ)([n] \k) ≥
fx+(0,d−k)([n])−[fx+(0,d−k)([n])−xk] = xk. Therefore k is iˆ-unsaturated. Now, we can apply Lemma
4.15 that f(S)+(x+d′)(U) = fx+d′(T ) ≤ f(T ). Summing this with: x([n]\T ) = f([n])−f(T ) we get:
x([n]\T )+(x+d′)(U) ≤ f([n])−f(S). To see this holds with equality, let xf be the final allocation of
the algorithm and notice that: f(S) ≥ xf (S) = f([n])−xf ([n]\S) = f([n])−[x([n]\T )+(x+d′)(U)].
This shows us that:
xf ([n] \ S) = x([n] \ T ) + (x+ d′)(U) = f([n])− f(S)
which establishes that the invariant is preserved from one iteration to another.
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A Appendix: Missing Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1 : Let v˜1 ≥ v˜2 ≥ . . . ≥ v˜n. The outcome of VCG allocates all the units to
player 1 and nothing to the other players, i.e., x1 = s, xi = 0 for i 6= 1. Also, π1 = v˜2 and πi = 0
for i 6= 1.
Let (x′, π′) be a Pareto-improvement. Since the utility of 1 improves, it must be the case that:
v1x
′
i−π
′
1 ≥ v1s−v˜2s. Therefore: π
′
1 ≤ v1x
′
1−v1s+v˜2s. Now, for each player i 6= 1, πi ≤ βixi ≤ v˜2xi.
So:
∑
i π
′
i ≤ v˜2s+ (v˜2 − v1)(s− x
′
1). But since it is a Pareto-improvement,
∑
i π
′
i ≥
∑
i πi = v˜2s, so
x′1 = s. Which implies that x = x
′, π = π′, which is a contradiction.
Note on the proof of Lemma 2.1: A alternative proof of Lemma 2.1 is to note that for multi-unit
auctions and just average budget constraints, the polyhedral clinching auction (Algorithm 2) boils
down to VCG on min{vi, βi}. Beyond multi-unit auctions, however, this is not the case anymore.
Proof of Lemma 4.16 : This is trivially true in the first time the algorithm reaches point (♣) ,
since at that point: f([n]) = fx+d([n]) = [f([n])−f([n]\i)]+f([n]\i) = xi+f([n]\i) = fx+(0,d−i)([n]),
after all, at that point di =∞ for all i. Now, we will show this invariant is preserved the next time
point (♣) is reached again.
Let d′ be the demand vector after the price of iˆ increased. Then clinched amounts are: δi =
fx+d′([n])− fx+(0,d′
−i)
([n]). The vector x is then updated to x+ δ and d′ to d′− δ. We want to show
that: f(x+δ)+(d′−δ)([n]) = f(x+δ)+(0,d′
−i+δ−i)
([n]). Which is :fx+d′([n]) = fx+(δi,d′−i)([n]).
By Lemma 4.14, fx+(0,d′
−i)
([n]) = min{fx+d′([n]), fx+d′([n] \ i)+xi}. If the minimum is the first
term, then δi = 0 and we are done. If it is the second term, then: δi = fx+d′([n])−fx+d′([n]\ i)−xi,
in which case: fx+(δi,d′−i)([n]) = min{fx+d′([n]), fx+d′([n] \ i) + xi + δi} = fx+d′([n]).
Proof of Lemma 4.17 : See that this invariant is preserved through the execution of the
algorithm. It is trivially true in the beginning since di = ∞ for all i. Now, if the invariant holds
at point (♣) , then by Lemma 4.16 f([n]) = fx+d([n]) = fx+(0,d
−iˆ
)([n]). Now, when the price
increases, the demands are updated and clinching happens, the value of x+(0, d−iˆ) doesn’t change,
since x
iˆ
doesn’t change and for i 6= iˆ, xi+ di doesn’t change, since xi is updated to xi+ δi and di is
updated to di − δi. Therefore if x˜, d˜ are the values of allocation and demands the next time point
(♣) is reached, then: fx˜+d˜([n]) = fx˜+d˜
−iˆ
([n]) = fx+(0,d
−iˆ
)([n]) = f([n]).
Proof of Lemma 4.18 : Notice it is enough to show that fx+(0,d−i)([n]) = fx+(0,d−i)([n] \ i) + xi
since one can extend for every set S ∋ i using submodularity, after all: xi ≥ fx+(0,d−i)(S) −
fx+(0,d−i)(S \ i) ≥ fx+(0,d−i)([n])− fx+(0,d−i)([n] \ i) = xi.
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When point (♣) is reached for the first time in the algorithm, the invariant fx+(0,d−i)([n]) =
fx+(0,d−i)([n]\ i)+xi holds trivially since xi = f([n])−f([n]\ i) = fx+(0,d−i)([n])−fx+(0,d−i)([n]\ i),
by Lemma 4.17 and the fact that at this point di =∞ for all i.
Now we will show that the invariant is preserved between two consecutive visits to point (♣) .
Say that x, d is the allocation and demands in point (♣) just before we increase price piˆ. Let d
′
iˆ
be the
new demand for iˆ and d′ = (d′
iˆ
, d−iˆ). We want to show that: fx+(0,d′−i)([n]) = fx+(0,d′−i)([n] \ i)+xi.
This is trivial for i = iˆ, since the expression is unaffected. For i 6= iˆ, we can use Lemma 4.14:
fx+(0,d′
−i)
([n])− fx+(0,d′
−i)
([n] \ i) = min{fx+(0,d−i)([n]), fx+(0,d−i)([n] \ iˆ) + xiˆ + d
′
iˆ
}−
min{fx+(0,d−i)([n] \ i), fx+(0,d−i)([n] \ {i, iˆ}) + xiˆ + d
′
iˆ
}
Now we can analyze four cases based on which expression achieves the minimum. One of those
four cases is impossible, since by submodularity: fx+(0,d−i)([n] \ {i, iˆ}) − fx+(0,d−i)([n] \ i) ≥
fx+(0,d−i)([n])− fx+(0,d−i)([n] \ iˆ), the minimum can’t be achived by fx+(0,d−i)([n]) in the first and
by fx+(0,d−i)([n] \ iˆ) + xiˆ + d
′
iˆ
in the second. Now, we proceed by analyzing the remaining cases:
• first / first: fx+(0,d′
−i)
([n])− fx+(0,d′
−i)
([n] \ i) = fx+(0,d−i)([n])− fx+(0,d−i)([n] \ i) = xi by the
invariant.
• second / second: fx+(0,d′
−i
)([n])−fx+(0,d′
−i
)([n]\i) = [fx+(0,d−i)([n]\iˆ)+xiˆ+d
′
iˆ
]−[fx+(0,d−i)([n]\
iˆ) + xiˆ+ d
′
iˆ
] ≥ fx+(0,d−i)([n])− fx+(0,d−i)([n] \ i) = xi. The inequality in the other direction is
trivial.
• second / first: in this case by the fact that the minimum is achieved by the first term in the
second expression, fx+(0,d−i)([n]\i) ≤ fx+(0,d−i)([n]\{i, iˆ})+xiˆ+d
′
iˆ
, therefore: fx+(0,d′
−i)
([n])−
fx+(0,d′
−i)
([n]\i) = fx+(0,d−i)([n]\iˆ)+xiˆ+d
′
iˆ
−fx+(0,d−i)([n]\i) ≥ fx+(0,d−i([n]\iˆ)−fx+(0,d−i([n]\
{i, iˆ}) ≥ xi. The inequality in the other direction is trivial.
This shows that the invariant holds even after we decrease the d
iˆ
. Before we reach point (♣)
again, allocation and demands change because of clinching. This, however, doesn’t change
the invariant, since clinching adds an extra δi amount to xi but subtracts the same amount
from d′i, so x+ d is constant. Therefore, clinching doesn’t affect the invariant.
18
